Post by Keith Heitmann on Mar 31, 2002 1:42:07 GMT -5
A while ago I posted an article (on the old Panzerblitz location) about how Kursk was not the fiasco for the Germans that one has come to believe since WW2 ended.
The book "Steel Storm" seems to bear this point out. In fact the book points out that the Germans nearly won the battle. However due to some clever feints by the Russians Hitler paniced and pulled 2. SS "Das Reich" out of the battle to meet these new "threats" and this effectively ended Operation Zitadel.
The account of the battle in this book give one the feeling that while the going was hard for the Germans during Operation Zitadel they were slowly decimating the Russians. The book recounts instance after instance where German long range gunnery from panzers and AT guns literally wiped out entire Russian tank corps for relatively minor losses. The book didn't seem to deal with German tank losses, but did mention the starting numbers.
In the battle for Porkhorovka the Russians had 850 tanks avialble on the first day. On the second day the Russian commander Rotmistrov noted that he could only field 100-150 combat-ready tanks. His strategic reserve of tanks was nearly gone.
1.SS "Leibstandarte" claimed 192 Soviet tanks destroyed the first day having lost only 17 of their own. Even the commander Paul Hausser didn't believe it until he visited the battlefield and began marking the burntout hulks with chalk confirming each kill.
The author notes that some histories say that the Germans had lost 300 tanks the first day, July 12, 1943, including 70 Tigers. The German admitted to losing 70 to 80 tanks the majority of which were from the 3.SS "Totenkopf" division. However, 2.SS "Das Reich" mechanics had repaired scores of tanks damaged earlier in the campaign and they had more tanks available on the second day than the first.
During the entire Operation Zitadel the Russian losses were placed at:
1149 tanks
459 AT guns
85 aircraft
47 artillery pieces
6441 prisoners
250,000 casualties
From the Soviet standpoint the battle was a strategic victory because they did prevent the Germans from breaking through to open territory and use their Blitzkrieg-style of battle to outflank, confuse, and surround the Russians.
Despite overwhelming odds the German SS and Army "Grossdeutschland" divisions seemed to be making slow but steady progress. He firmly puts the blame on Hitler for not allowing his commanders the time to punch through to Kursk and prematurely ending the battle. And, for delaying the battle until the new Panther tanks could be supplied in substantial numbers to the "Grossdeutschland" division. This gave the Soviets time to prepare, plus the Germans were unaware that Britain was feeding Ultra information about the pending Kursk offensive to the Russians.
Army Group South under von Manstein had just come off the one of the biggest victories of the war for the Germans, the retaking of Kharkov in mid-March, 1943. Both sides were exhausted and in need of reorganization.
Had the German Operation Zitadel been immediately initiated in April or June, as some commanders, wanted instead of waiting 2-3 months to build up forces do you think that the Germans may have achieved a strategic victory at Kursk?
The book "Steel Storm" seems to bear this point out. In fact the book points out that the Germans nearly won the battle. However due to some clever feints by the Russians Hitler paniced and pulled 2. SS "Das Reich" out of the battle to meet these new "threats" and this effectively ended Operation Zitadel.
The account of the battle in this book give one the feeling that while the going was hard for the Germans during Operation Zitadel they were slowly decimating the Russians. The book recounts instance after instance where German long range gunnery from panzers and AT guns literally wiped out entire Russian tank corps for relatively minor losses. The book didn't seem to deal with German tank losses, but did mention the starting numbers.
In the battle for Porkhorovka the Russians had 850 tanks avialble on the first day. On the second day the Russian commander Rotmistrov noted that he could only field 100-150 combat-ready tanks. His strategic reserve of tanks was nearly gone.
1.SS "Leibstandarte" claimed 192 Soviet tanks destroyed the first day having lost only 17 of their own. Even the commander Paul Hausser didn't believe it until he visited the battlefield and began marking the burntout hulks with chalk confirming each kill.
The author notes that some histories say that the Germans had lost 300 tanks the first day, July 12, 1943, including 70 Tigers. The German admitted to losing 70 to 80 tanks the majority of which were from the 3.SS "Totenkopf" division. However, 2.SS "Das Reich" mechanics had repaired scores of tanks damaged earlier in the campaign and they had more tanks available on the second day than the first.
During the entire Operation Zitadel the Russian losses were placed at:
1149 tanks
459 AT guns
85 aircraft
47 artillery pieces
6441 prisoners
250,000 casualties
From the Soviet standpoint the battle was a strategic victory because they did prevent the Germans from breaking through to open territory and use their Blitzkrieg-style of battle to outflank, confuse, and surround the Russians.
Despite overwhelming odds the German SS and Army "Grossdeutschland" divisions seemed to be making slow but steady progress. He firmly puts the blame on Hitler for not allowing his commanders the time to punch through to Kursk and prematurely ending the battle. And, for delaying the battle until the new Panther tanks could be supplied in substantial numbers to the "Grossdeutschland" division. This gave the Soviets time to prepare, plus the Germans were unaware that Britain was feeding Ultra information about the pending Kursk offensive to the Russians.
Army Group South under von Manstein had just come off the one of the biggest victories of the war for the Germans, the retaking of Kharkov in mid-March, 1943. Both sides were exhausted and in need of reorganization.
Had the German Operation Zitadel been immediately initiated in April or June, as some commanders, wanted instead of waiting 2-3 months to build up forces do you think that the Germans may have achieved a strategic victory at Kursk?
